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1. Introduction 
 
The number of instances of cooperation in research activities has been growing steadily since mid 
20th century.3 Firms have noticed the advantages of improved information flow, abolishment of 
effort duplication, synergies and innovation sharing, they have commenced establishing research 
partnerships via creating new companies or allocating their joint resources contractually. On the 
other hand, this type of cooperation raised great concerns of the antitrust authorities, which were 
eager to punish any type of horizontal cooperation. However, as a response to the diminishing 
competitiveness of the US and EU R&D markets, new policies allowing these partnerships needed 
to be formulated in order not to lose the competitive technological edge to the emerging economies. 
 
Currently, public authorities explicitly prohibit collusive market behavior.4 At the same time they 
seldom discourage cooperation in R&D activities due to e.g. Block Exemption Regulations (see 
Appendix D). On the contrary, there are numerous examples of policy measures meant to stimulate 
the formation of research joint ventures (RJVs).5 However, as mentioned also in Lambertini et al. 
(2002), encouraging cooperative R&D and discouraging market collusion can be inconsistent if 
cooperation in R&D tends to induce collusion in the product market. This inconsistency can be 
further aggravated by the improper design of innovation and competition policy instruments, such as 
R&D subsidies and antitrust fines. 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the current innovation and competition policies, 
implemented through R&D subsidies for independent or cooperative research activities and antitrust 
fines. We aim to answer the question whether two policies contradict each other and what the 
governments should be aware of when formulating both policies. The main contribution of our paper 
is analysis of collusion sustainability changes due to implementation of antitrust fines and R&D 
subsidies in an existing framework. The model based on a stochastic grim trigger strategy patent 
race of Miyagiwa (2009) is constructed implementing the aforementioned policy tools, and analyzed 
for various ranges of antitrust fines and subsidies. Additional subsidies given to research 
partnerships or RJVs are found to facilitate collusion, while antitrust fines are found to be usable to 
remedy this collusion facilitating effect. However, it is shown that the combined usage of these 
policies may not always have a welfare enhancing effect and each case needs to be thoroughly 
analyzed by antitrust authorities based on the market and research conditions. 
 
We are not the first to look at the interaction between R&D cooperation and product market 
collusion. Other references include Martin (1993, 1995), van Wegberg (1995), Cabral (2000), 
Lambertini et al. (2002, 2003) and Miyagiwa (2009).  The effects of R&D subsidies also have been 
analyzed by some researchers (see e.g. Katz (1986), Romano (1989), Folster (1995) or Hinloopen 
(1997, 2000)) but never in the context of collusion sustainability. Filling in this gap in the literature  
is the main contribution of the current paper. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related literature. Section 3 
outlines the model. Section 4 examines the collusive equilibrium under competitive and cooperative 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Caloghirou et al. (2003) for stylized facts. 
4 See e.g. EC (2006), Articles 101 and 102 of the EC Treaty or DOJ (2010). 
5 See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US or EU Research and Innovation DG, FP7 (2011). 
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R&D. In section 5 we discuss policy implications. Some model extensions and robustness of the 
results are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In the mid 20th century the antitrust authorities have been vicious with regard to any cooperation 
between firms, even at the development levels. However, the legislation towards regulating 
cooperative research and development agreements has become milder now. In both the US and EU 
competition law cooperative R&D agreements are not prohibited but even encouraged. The 
discussion of whether cooperatively carried out R&D is dangerous for competition in the product 
market, however, is still being raised. In this section an overview of how the R&D choices of firms 
have been modeled is provided, covering the highlights of both deterministic and stochastic 
innovation, under price and quantity competition. 
 
The topic of R&D and innovation has been appealing to the IO audience for quite a long time. 
Conversely, it has not been until the paper by D’Aspermont and Jaquemin (1988) when it took a 
new turn in the direction of cooperative R&D agreements. The sparked interest has continued and 
the deterministic innovation with spillover effects has been thoroughly researched through the 90’s 
(see e.g. Kamien et al. (1992), Brood and Shivakumar (1997), Hinloopen (1997, 2000), Amir 
(2000)).  
 
Later Lambertini et al. (2002, 2003) adds to this literature by introducing deterministic product 
innovation in contrast to process innovation employed by the previously mentioned authors. 
Contrary to the case of stochastic innovation models, which are discussed in the following 
paragraph, here it is assumed that firms are not active in the product market prior the involvement in 
the development stage. Also, the product is successfully developed with probability 1. This 
assumption is credible due to the nature of product innovation because it may be perceived as more 
of a marketing effort than a high-tech one, and thus the cost of positioning a newly developed 
product can be generally known and fixed. Analysis in Lambertini et al. (2002) concentrates on 
firms’ choices of product position in horizontal or vertical product space and generally finds that for 
horizontal product differentiation it can actually destabilize collusion if firms develop the product 
jointly. This happens mainly due to the fact that after the joint innovation which homogenizes the 
product, the horizontal product differentiation is lost and firms cannot collude for some values of 
discount factors, for which they could have colluded in the independent product development case. 
They show that in the independent product development case, firms can sustain collusion for lower 
discount factors even if they do not position their products as prescribed by full collusion under the 
cooperative R&D. In the independent R&D case firms have the luxury of colluding even when 
placing their products farther apart from each other. Therefore, with deterministic product 
innovation and horizontal product differentiation, the authors show that collusion is actually 
hindered by the formation of an RJV, which is a very desirable result.  In the vertical product 
differentiation setting Lambertini et al. (2002) do not find a collusion hindering or facilitating effects 
stemming from firms’ R&D choices. 
 
Another way of modeling cooperative versus non-cooperative R&D is through stochastic 
innovation. The outcome of R&D cannot be determined to succeed with 100 percent probability, 
while the models of d’Aspermont and Jaquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992) imply that firms 
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can achieve any cost reduction level given that they want to spend resources on it. Hence, another 
aspect of the R&D modeling stems from the fact that firms cannot with certainty say whether a 
particular amount of investment will result in definite cost reduction. It is rather through either 
continuous or discrete time stochastic modeling that we can estimate the expected time or expected 
expenses of an R&D. Furthermore, the deterministic models tend not to be able to provide 
implications about collusion sustainability, while it is possible to do within a stochastic framework. 
 
The pioneering research in this field was that of Martin (1995), who used continuous time 
discounting to estimate the implications of forming an RJV for sustainability of collusion. He 
introduced patent protection and continuous choice of research inputs. In his original model, both 
costs of research and the success probability (defined through exponential probability distribution) 
depended on the research investments. There are no spillovers in his model, but as he uses a general 
research cost function, they can be easily added via introducing them through the effort levels.6 His 
main result was that, all else equal, firms will be able to sustain product market collusion more 
easily if they form an RJV. As a means to prove this he uses discounted expected profits from 
investing in innovation either alone or in alliance with the partner. While there is place for product 
market collusion in the development stage, he does not model collusion implications for the post 
discovery collusion, stating that the qualitative implications will be similar. The beauty of his 
approach lies in the usage of exponential distribution function for discounting, which transforms the 
complicated integrals over time into static expressions for values. Therefore, a collusive value of a 
research joint venture outweighs the deviation value with RJV more than it does for collusion 
without forming an RJV, which is also shown for a general case of the R&D cost function. The only 
assumption that Martin imposes is that the research effort in an RJV is going to be smaller than in 
the case with independent R&D, which contradicts the deterministic innovation results, which, for 
instance, Brood and Shivakumar (1997) get with a general D’Aspermont and Jaquemin (1988). On 
the other hand, Martin states that such relationship is mainly due to stochastic nature of the game 
with patent protection and that firms are going to reduce their research effort with an RJV mainly 
due to the expectation that they cannot lose the patent race and they will not be trying to reduce the 
probability of the rival winning the patent first. An additional Martin’s assumption of perfect effort 
observability is criticized by Cabral (2000). 
 
Cabral (2000) offers a slightly different approach on modeling of the collusion sustainability, his 
main focus being kept on differentiated probabilities of success through unobservable research 
efforts. That is, he incorporates the choice of deviation from the agreed research effort in his 
modeling of cooperative R&D. Ultimately he speaks in favor of product market competition. He 
finds equilibria where firms choose full research effort and compete below monopoly prices. He 
generally shows that for specific set of assumptions there exist stationary equilibria in which firms 
will find it optimal to set prices below the monopoly level in order to sustain high investments in 
R&D. One of the more constraining assumptions is that R&D output spillovers are complete, i.e. the 
newly discovered technology is a public good and there is no patent protection. From the modeling 
standpoint, Cabral (2000) is the first one to present RJVs in the discrete time trigger strategy setting. 
His other innovation is introduction of different success probabilities if firms are working together 
or independently. 
 
                                                 
6 See section on stochastic innovation in Martin (2001).  
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Our paper utilizes a different model offered by Miyagiwa (2009), which is also based on a price 
setting super-game. Miyagiwa (2009) approach is more versatile in the sense that it includes both 
patent protection in a stochastic setting and a proper market competition model with comparable 
profits, where it is easy to incorporate the focal policy tools. In general, Miyagiwa’s (2009) findings 
confirm those of Martin (1995) extending them to collusion in post-discovery markets. Formation of 
an RJV in general facilitates collusion, and collusion in the RJV regime is easier prior the discovery 
than post discovery, while in the independent R&D regime it is in general easier post discovery than 
prior. A welfare comparison between the two regimes of independent R&D and RJV revealed that 
welfare gains with the formation of RJV can occur when the switch happens from collusion under 
independent R&D to collusion under RJV. 
 
Finally, literature on the effects of various policy tools in the presence of cooperative R&D is 
generally very scarce. In this paragraph we review three papers in which these issues are addressed. 
Hinloopen (1997) extends the model of d’Aspermont and Jaquemin (1988) with R&D cost 
subsidies, where firms are also taxed from their profits. Lambertini et al. (2003) address the issue 
through the possibility of subsidizing or taxing the research expenses so as to optimize the critical 
discount factor levels in the presence of the substitutability parameter of the product that the firms 
are developing. Ruble and Versaevel (2009) examine the validity of the combined market share 
threshold below which the EU firms are allowed to form horizontal agreements. Note that neither of 
the policy tools were ever addressed within stochastic R&D framework, which is the main 
innovation of our paper. In the following section we are extending the stochastic innovation 
framework of Miyagiwa (2009) with innovation and competition policy tools, such as R&D 
subsidies and antitrust fines, and derive the policy implications with respect to the fine-subsidy 
interaction.  
 
3. The model 
 
As was pointed out in the previous section, it is generally found that forming the Research Joint 
Ventures (RJVs) in itself has implications for collusion sustainability. As is shown by e.g. Miyagiwa 
(2009) and Martin (1995), formation of an RJV facilitates collusion. A stochastic innovation 
framework is followed in our paper as the R&D subsidization implications have already been 
researched in the deterministic models by Hinloopen (1997, 2000).. 
 
In our analysis of subsidies grantable for the R&D investments on one side, and antitrust fine 
enforcement on the other, we combine the setup by Miyagiwa (2009) with elements of Cabral 
(2000). In his model, Miyagiwa (2009) explains the concept of RJVs in a broader sense than through 
formation of a single R&D department of all the participants: rather through full innovation sharing 
after the discovery has been achieved.7 The following analysis adapts a similar assumption.8 
                                                 
7 For analysis in this paper we will compare the impact of policy instruments on collusion sustainability under 
independent R&D regime and under cooperative RJV (research joint venture) regime. Hagedoorn et al. (2000) classifies 
RJV’s as formal R&D contracts or consortia created to pool up R&D resources without involving in joint equity 
agreements. Miyagiwa (2009) cites RJVs as technology-sharing arrangements including royalty-free cross-licensing 
agreements, meaning that all the outcomes of research are completely shared among the participants (a similar view 
towards cooperative research is employed by the European Union legislation, see EU (2011)). The latter implies that 
RJV may also be seen as a risk diminishing endeavor, especially if we are looking at dynamic stochastic models of 
R&D. In their favor, the costs of forming and dissolving RJVs are much lower than those related to equity partnerships. 
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The model uses a discrete time grim trigger strategy set-up in order to investigate the problem of 
fine-subsidy interaction taking place in the cooperative versus independent R&D environment. We 
model a repeated game with an infinite time horizon and analyze the collusion sustainability 
differences. 
 
Introduction of variables and timing of the game: The market consists of two ex-ante symmetric 
firms, which are involved in a patent race for making a cost reducing innovation. The product 
market is characterized by the oligopolistic price competition model. If firms are successful in 
carrying out the innovation, they reduce their costs from ܿ to ܿ. A cost ܿௗ marks the threshold for 
drastic innovation, in which a successful firm acts as an unconstrained monopolist by undercutting 
its rival, or it satisfies ܿ ൌ ݌௠ሺܿௗሻ. The function ݌௠ሺܿሻ maximizes an unconstrained monopolist’s 
profit given his marginal cost, i.e. ݌௠ሺܿሻ ൌ  argmax ܦሺ݌ሻሺ݌ െ ܿሻ. The demand ܦሺ݌ሻ is twice 
differentiable, with ܦᇱሺ݌ሻ ൏ 0 and ܦᇱᇱሺ݌ሻ ൑ 0.  
 
There also exists a system of patent protection, where a patent’s lifespan is infinite. If both firms 
make the discovery simultaneously, each of them has an equal chance of obtaining the patent first. 
The time is discrete and at time ݐ ൌ 1 each firm possesses identical technology and produces 
homogenous products at symmetric and constant marginal cost ܿ. In each period ݐ ൒ 1 firms decide 
whether to invest in R&D in order to invent a new cost reducing technology to produce at ܿ ൏ ܿ. 
Prior to the discovery firms incur the costs ݇ of running their R&D departments. If the research is 
conducted cooperatively (in an RJV), the probability of simultaneous success is denoted by ߙ ൅ ߚ, 
and if separately (independent R&D regime), the probability of simultaneous success is lower and 
equal ߙ, where 0 ൑ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൑ 1 and 0 ൑ ߚ ൑ ߙ ൑ 1.9 Firms make their choices subject to their time 
preferences defined through the common discount factor ߜ.   
 
Policy instruments: The primary novelty of this paper lies in the introduction of subsidies covering 
the costs of innovation on one end, and antitrust fines imposed to punish collusive behavior on the 
other. Taking current regulations of the EU Framework Program for research and technological 
development as a reference (see e.g. EU Research and Innovation DG, FP7 (2011) or Eureka 
Program (2011)), subsidies are modeled as a fraction of the research costs ݏ݇ given to firms to cover 
part of their expenses ݇, making the overall R&D expenditures by each firm equal ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ. Current 
EU innovation policy focuses on promoting cooperative R&D; therefore, we assume that if firms 
form an RJV, they receive higher subsidies than independently innovating ones ሺݏ ൅ ݎሻ݇, where 
ݎ denotes the subsidy difference between independent R&D and RJV regimes. This implies that the 
research expenditures per firm are given by ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ if a research joint venture is formed. The 
antitrust fines for collusion are assumed to be fixed and the expected fine is given by ݍ݂, where ݍ is 
                                                                                                                                                                   
In the model extensions section, we also show that the OE (operating entity) joint ventures can be more dangerous to 
competition integrity than RJVs. 
8 As a matter of fact, if we imagine modern research cooperation it is very plausible that due to advanced 
communication technologies it is unlikely that companies would be willing to incur additional costs of moving their 
R&D facilities. 
9 For simplicity of showing our results and for their comparability with the model of Miyagiwa (2009), in the model 
solution section we assume that ߚ ൌ 0, i.e. the knowledge spillovers are complete or the R&D know-how is shared by 
all firms. This assumption is relaxed in the model extensions section and it is shown that the main implications of the 
analysis still hold in that setting. The detailed derivation of this result are available from authors upon request. 
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the probability of detection by the antitrust authority and ݂ is the fine itself. We assume that firms 
are notorious and continue collusion even after they are discovered by the antitrust authorities.10 
 
Price leadership hypothesis: As already mentioned, there exists a cost ܿௗ, at which the innovator 
may act as an unconstrained monopolist. Let us assume hereafter that the innovation is non-drastic, 
and the implemented innovation leads to the cost reduction in the range ܿ  א  ሾܿௗ, ܿሻ.  This is one of 
the cornerstones of the analysis by Miyagiwa (2009), because it implies that there is room for 
collusion in the case of non cooperative R&D, while otherwise the innovating firm would drive out 
the non-innovator and enjoy the full monopoly profits.11  
 
The price leadership hypothesis proposed by Miyagiwa (2009) implies that the innovator rather than 
limit pricing his runner-up opponent, decides to offer him an opportunity to share the market at the 
innovator’s terms. In particular, the low cost firm communicates its market sharing rule ݀ which it 
chooses so as to maximize its profits and to keep the non-innovating firm from deviating from this 
collusive agreement. Miyagiwa (2009) finds that the collusive price ݌௖ and market sharing rule ݀ 
are ݌௖ ൌ ݌௠൫ܿ൯ and ݀ ൌ ߜ ൒ ଵଶ with ߜ being the discount factor. We will further consider what 
happens to this market sharing rule when fines and subsidies are introduced. 
 
3.1. Non-collusive game after the breakdown of the cartel 
 
First, let us describe the non-collusive game that firms play after the collusion breaks down. In this 
game, the firms set their prices to ܿ prior and after the discovery. We denote this strategy profile by 
P (where P stands for punishment). In the post-discovery case, setting the price to ܿ, the innovator 
limit-prices his rival driving him out of the market and earns ߨ௅ ൌ ܦሺܿሻ൫ܿ െ ܿ൯ ൐ 0. Since firms 
both race for obtaining the patent in this case, each period they both have a chance ߙ of making the 
discovery, and if it is made, an equal probability ቀଵଶቁ of obtaining the patent. We assume that ݇ is 
sufficiently low so that the expected payoff of playing the strategy P, ௉ܸ, is non-negative and 
investment in R&D is meaningful. The expected payoff of a firm can be thus summarized as 
 
௉ܸ ൌ െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ߜߙ2 ቀ
ߨ௅
1 െ ߜቁ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௉ܸ . (1)
The first term in the above expression denotes the total amount of R&D expenditures after subsidies 
in the period before the discovery. In the next period, the discovery is made with probability ߙ and 
one of the firms becomes the innovator with probability ଵଶ and limit prices the opponent earning ߨ௅ 
forever thereafter. The third term reflects that with probability ሺ1 െ ߙሻ the discovery is not made 
and then the game repeats until the innovation is developed. Collecting terms, this recursive 
expression can be rewritten as 
 ௉ܸ ൌ
െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ߜߙ2 ቀ
ߨ௅1 െ ߜቁ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ . 
 
                                                 
10 Similar assumption is adopted in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003). 
11 Note that limit-pricing an opponent due to decreased marginal costs does not necessarily mean abuse of dominant 
position. The latter implies acting absolutely independently of the competitors in raising price above marginal costs, 
while non-drastic innovation means not being able to do so. 
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4. Analysis of collusive strategies 
 
In this section we examine what does the introduction of fines and subsidies do to the collusion 
sustainability prior and after the discovery in case of Independent R&D and RJV. In each case we 
focus on the modifications that the introduction of these policy tools brings to the payoff functions 
and critical discount factors for collusion sustainability outlined in Miyagiwa (2009). 
 
4.1. Independent R&D in the presence of subsidies and antitrust fines 
 
4.1.1. Post discovery collusion and impact of antitrust fines on the market-sharing rule 
 
First, we analyze the post-discovery collusion. After the discovery has taken place, there are only 
two possible cases: either the observed price is ݌௖ (the agreed collusive price) or it is different. After 
the different price has been observed, a firm adopts the punishment strategy P. Otherwise, 
maintaining the collusive price will be sub-game perfect if both firms will not have profitable 
deviations. Now, let us analyze how our extensions affect the equilibrium collusive market sharing 
rule ݀ introduced by Miyagiwa (2009) such that post-discovery collusion is sustainable. The 
innovator maximizes his profit by setting ݌௖ ൌ ݌௠൫ܿ൯. Thus the per-period payoff for the innovator 
(patent-holder) taking into account per-period expected penalty of ݍ݂ is given by 
ߨூ ൌ ݀ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ ݍ݂. 
And for the non-innovator this payoff is given by 
ߨே ൌ ሺ1 െ ݀ሻܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ ݍ݂. 
Let us denote the profit of the non-innovator at the innovator’s monopoly price as ߨேௌ ൌ
 ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ and the monopoly profit of the innovator as ݉ ൌ ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯. 
Then one period deviation is not profitable for the non-innovator if 
ሺ1 െ ݀ሻߨேௌ െ ݍ݂
1 െ ߜ ൒  ߨேௌ. 
This can be rearranged to 
ߜ െ ݍ݂ߨேௌ ൒  ݀. 
Since the innovator is seeking to maximize his payoff ߨூ subject to the above constraint, he will 
basically set the proposed market share to the highest value possible, i.e. ݀כ ൌ  ߜ െ ݍ݂/ߨேௌ . We 
can immediately observe that compared to the case with no fine enforcement discussed in Miyagiwa 
(2009), the market share that the innovator enjoys is smaller than ߜ, since the term ݍ݂/ߨேௌ   is 
positive and increasing in ݍ݂. This implies that in this setting the innovator enjoys a smaller market 
share compared to the case where antitrust enforcement is absent, because he is aware that fines 
make deviation more attractive to the non-innovator. Thus the leader is required to increase the 
share of the follower in this collusive contract. In the remainder of the paper we call the optimal 
market sharing rule ݀כ.  
 
Finally, the innovator also should not have profitable deviations. Collusion for the innovator yields 
݀כ݉ with possibility of receiving a fine each period, while deviation yields full monopoly profits ݉ 
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for one period and the limit-pricing profits ߨ௅ in all subsequent periods. So, the non-deviation 
condition for the innovator can be written as follows 
݀כ݉ െ ݍ݂
1 െ ߜ ൒ ݉ ൅
ߜߨ௅
1 െ ߜ. 
Recall that ݀כ ൌ  ߜ െ ௤௙గಿೄ. Rearranging we get 
 ߜ ൒
݉ ൬1 ൅ ݍ݂ߨேௌ൰ ൅ ݍ݂
2݉ െ ߨ௅ ؠ ߜ
஺. (2) 
The critical discount factor ߜ஺, which is the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain collusion 
in the post discovery periods with independent R&D is unambiguously larger with enforcement than 
without, and is increasing in expected fine ݍ݂. Importantly, we can observe that fine enforcement 
has a double effect on collusion sustainability in this setting expressed through the terms ݍ݂ and 
ݍ݂/ߨேௌ . Firstly, fines directly decrease the expected payoffs of the non-innovator, which would 
make it harder to collude in any setting. Secondly, fines decrease the market share ݀כ that the 
innovator is optimally offering to the non-innovator thus directly decreasing the collusive profits of 
the leading firm. Through decreased collusive profits, the innovator now requires a higher discount 
factor than before to make collusion sustainable. This critical discount factor ߜ஺ is illustrated in the 
schematic൫ߜ, ܿ൯-diagram in Figure 1, where it is represented by the solid line A2A2. 
 
4.1.2. Pre-discovery collusion in the presence of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies 
 
Next, we continue with analyzing collusion prior the discovery. Here we will be able to examine the 
role of subsidies in determining the collusion sustainability. In every period before discovery, both 
firms observe each other’s prices and whether there has been a discovery in the period before. The 
collusive strategy prior the discovery can be described as follows (assuming current period is ߬). 
There are four cases: (I) no discovery in ߬ െ 1 and no price deviations to date; (II) no discovery in 
߬ െ 1 and a price deviation has been observed before; (III) discovery in ߬ െ 1 and no price 
deviations to date; (IV) discovery in ߬ െ 1 and a price deviation has been observed before. In cases 
(II) and (IV) firms adopt the punishment strategy P forever after due to grim trigger strategy profile. 
In case of (III) firms adopt post discovery collusive strategy described before. Only case (I) has to 
be checked for profitable deviations. If the collusive price is unchanged and discovery has not been 
made, the firms will be able to sustain collusion if their collusive expected profits are higher than the 
one-shot deviation and the expected profits from taking part in the patent race independently. We 
define the collusive payoffs as ூܸ஼ (where IC stands for Independent R&D Collusion). Also, the per-
period present discounted values of the post discovery profits of the innovator and non-innovator are 
as ݒூ ൌ ௗ
כ௠ି௤௙
ଵିఋ  and ݒே ൌ  
ሺଵିௗכሻగಿೄି௤௙
ଵିఋ  , where the profits ݉ and ߨேௌ and the optimal market 
sharing rule (݀כ) were defined before. Then the value of collusion is given by the collusive per 
period profits ݉/2 minus the expected fine ݍ݂ and development costs reduced by an R&D subsidy 
݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ, where ݉ is the monopoly profit under the old technology. In the subsequent periods firms 
become either the patent race winners or losers with equal probability, thus the expected discounted 
payoffs if the discovery is made are ఋఈଶ ሺݒூ ൅ ݒேሻ, and if no discovery is made, the cycle is repeated. 
ூܸ஼ ൌ ݉2 െ ݍ݂ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅
ߜߙ
2 ሺݒூ ൅ ݒேሻ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ூܸ஼ 
Rearranging the above expression implies 
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ூܸ஼ ൌ
݉
2 െ ݍ݂ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅
ߜߙ
2 ሺݒூ ൅ ݒேሻ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ . 
The one shot deviation payoffs are given by ூܸ஽ (where ID stands for Independent R&D Deviation). 
A deviating firm earns ݉ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ for one period but finds itself in state (II) and (IV) in the 
following period. Hence, the deviation yields the expected profit 
ூܸ஽ ൌ ݉ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ߜߙ2 ቀ
ߨ௅
1 െ ߜቁ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௉ܸ. 
Where the firms revert to the punishment strategy P in the subsequent periods. Recalling the 
expression (1) this can be rewritten as ூܸ஽ ൌ ݉ ൅ ௉ܸ. In other words, the collusion will be 
sustainable prior the discovery if ூܸ஼ ൒ ூܸ஽ or if 
ூܸ஼ െ ௉ܸ ൒ ݉. 
Substituting expressions for ூܸ஼ , ௉ܸ and ݀כ in the above inequality and rearranging we get 
 ݉
2 െ ݍ݂ ൅
ߜߙ
2ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ቆ൬ߜ െ
ݍ݂
ߨேௌ൰ ݉ ൅ ൬1 െ ߜ ൅
ݍ݂
ߨேௌ൰ ߨேௌ െ ߨ௅ െ 2ݍ݂ቇ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൒ ݉. (3)
The expression for ߜ which equalizes the above inequality is tedious algebraically. However, it is 
verified in the Appendix A that this discount factor is between ଵଶ and 1. We implicitly define the 
discount factor at which (3) holds with equality by ߜ஻ሺݍ݂, ܿሻ, where it is the critical discount factor 
for collusion sustainability in pre-discovery periods of the Independent R&D regime. For certain 
parameter ranges this discount factor can be smaller or larger than the discount factor ߜ஺ derived in 
(2). Consequently, we arrive at the following results. 
 
Lemma 1. The critical discount factor before discovery in the Independent R&D regime is always 
larger than  ଵଶ.  
Proof: See Appendix A.ז 
 
Result 2. If the common discount factor ߜ exceeds ݉ܽݔሺߜ஺, ߜ஻ሻ, collusion can be sustained in both 
post and pre discovery phases in the Independent R&D regime. 
 
The implications of Lemma 1 and Result 2 are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Whenever firms 
find themselves in the Area 1 (above both loci A2A2 and B2B2, which denote ߜ஺ ܽ݊݀ ߜ஻, 
respectively) they may easily maintain collusion prior and after the discovery in the regime of 
Independent R&D.  
 
4.1.3. Collusion sustainability in the presence of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies  
 
Our main aim is to analyze what does the introduction of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies do to the 
collusion sustainability both prior and after the discovery. Collusion sustainability here is defined 
through critical discount factors prior and after discovery, ߜ஺ and ߜ஻, respectively. The results of 
Miyagiwa (2009) suggest that it can be hard to sustain collusion prior the discovery for high ܿ and 
easier to sustain it for low ܿ and sufficiently high ߜ (the slope of ߜ஻ is negative). Similar to 
Miyagiwa (2009), we can plot the critical discount factors ߜ஺, ߜ஻ in the (ߜ, ܿ) space (see Figure 1). 
For reference, the discount factors without fine enforcement and subsidies are also illustrated by 
dotted lines, A1A1 and B1B1, respectively. 
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Inequality (2) also implies that fine enforcement unambiguously increases the critical discount 
factor of post-discovery collusion throughout the entire range of cost reductions ܿ through the 
appearance in the numerator of terms ݉ ௤௙గಿೄ  and ݍ݂. Effectively, we can conclude that the critical 
discount factor ߜ஺ with fine enforcement will appear above the curve without fine enforcement for 
all values of ܿ except for ܿ ൌ ܿௗ, where it merges with unity. ߜ஺ with fine enforcement is plotted in 
Figure 1 as solid line A2A2 together with the same locus absent fine enforcement (dotted line A1A1).  
 
Next, recall the inequality (3). It is the inequality for the critical discount factor before discovery. 
Before the invention, firms make investments in R&D, which are also subsidized by the 
government. It would seem that it might make collusion easier; however, it is not the case, for the 
term ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ cancels out from two sides of the equation, thus concluding that neither the size of 
R&D investments, nor the size of subsidies has any impact for the collusion sustainability before 
discovery in the case of independent R&D with complete spillovers. The expected fine, on the other 
hand, will have a collusion destabilizing effect, which is proven in Proposition 4. Plotting this new 
discount factor requires to put it above the analogous ߜ஻ without fine enforcement B1B1. In Figure 1 
the solid curve B2B2 represents ߜ஻ with fine enforcement and is above B1B1 through the entire range 
of cost parameters ܿ. In summary, both prior and after discovery critical discount factors increase in 
the presence of antitrust fines. 
 
The area above both solid lines in Figure 1 represents the analogue of Region 1 of Miyagiwa (2009). 
It shows the pairs of ൫ߜ, ܿ൯ at which firms can collude both before and after the discovery. Note that 
ܿௗ ܿ 
1
2  
1 
ܿ
1
2 ൅ ݍ݂/݉ 
ߜ 
A1 
A1 
A2 
B2
B1 
B1 
B2 
Figure 1: Loci of critical discount factors in the (ߜ, ܿሻ-space and changes in areas of collusion 
sustainability. (Independent R&D regime) 
Dotted lines ܣଵܣଵ and ܤଵܤଵ represent critical discount factors without enforcement. Solid lines ܣଶܣଶ
and ܤଶܤଶ: with enforcement. Horizontal line ܥଶܥଶ represents the critical discount factor ߜூ஼ଶ. 
1
2ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൅
ݍ݂
2݉ሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
Area 3 (collusion only prior discovery) 
Area 1 (collusion 
before and after 
discovery) 
Area 2 (collusion 
only after 
discovery) 
A2 
C2  C2 
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because of the introduction of expected fines ݍ݂, the area shrunk. I.e. there are less pairs of ൫ߜ, ܿ൯ at 
which firms can collude both before and after the discovery. Careful analysis of expressions (2) and 
(3) implies the following propositions.  
 
Proposition 3. In the case with independent R&D, subsidies do not facilitate collusion. 
Proof: See Appendix A. ז 
 
Proposition 4. Fines effectively hinder collusion both prior and after the discovery in independent 
R&D regime. 
Proof: See Appendix A. ז 
 
Let us now also consider the situations where firms collude only after the discovery and not prior or 
vice versa. First, if ܿ is such that ߜ஺ ൏ ߜ ൏ ߜ஻, then firms can effectively collude after the discovery 
but not before it. This pair of ሺߜ, ܿሻ is reflected by the Area 2 in Figure 1. On the other hand, it can 
also be the case that ܿ is such that ߜ஻ ൏ ߜ ൏ ߜ஺, which means that firms do not collude after the 
discovery, but can do that before. However, we need to re-check for the sustainability of such a 
strategy, since the payoffs change. As now firms revert to competition after the discovery, in this 
case collusion payoff prior discovery ூܸ஼ଶ becomes 
ூܸ஼ଶ ൌ
݉
2 െ ݍ݂ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅
ߜߙ
2 ቀ
ߨ௅1 െ ߜቁ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ . 
While deviation payoffs stay the same. Inequality (3) in effect can be rewritten as 
೘
మ ି௤௙
ଵିఋሺଵିఈሻ ൒ ݉. 
Isolating the discount factor, this implies 
ߜ ൒ 12ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൅
ݍ݂
2݉ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ؠ ߜ
ூ஼ଶ. 
Let us call this critical discount factor ߜூ஼ଶ. The term ௤௙ଶ௠ሺଵିఈሻ appears only due to enforcement and 
is unambiguously positive. The entire RHS of the above equation is below 1 only for ߙ ൏ ଵଶ െ
௤௙
ଶ௠. 
Hence, it can be concluded that for high enough probability of success the firms will never collude 
prior the discovery. Assuming that ߙ is low enough, let us plot the line ߜூ஼ଶ ൌ ଵଶሺଵିఈሻ ൅
௤௙
ଶ௠ሺଵିఈሻ in 
the Figure 1 and call the area above it and below ߜ஺ the Area 3. This critical discount factor ߜூ஼ଶ is 
denoted by C2C2 in the Figure 1. 
 
Area 3 the analogue of the Region 3 of Miyagiwa (2009), and it marks the pairs of the discount 
factor and costs at which collusion is possible only prior discovery but not after. Moreover, the 
range of success probabilities ߙ, for which collusion prior discovery is feasible, is also smaller 
compared to the findings in Miyagiwa (2009). This implies that in the presence of antitrust fines it is 
more difficult to sustain collusion before discovery as well.  
 
4.2. Research joint ventures in the presence of R&D subsidies and antitrust fines 
 
Let us now move on to the analysis of product market collusion in an RJV setting. Following the 
current EU R&D co-financing rules, we assume that if firms form an RJV, they can get a higher 
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level of subsidization, given by ݇ሺݏ ൅ ݎሻ, than the firms undertaking the R&D independently, which 
is ݇ݏ for independent developers. Note that ݎ א ሾݏ, 1ሿ, where ݎ denotes the subsidy difference 
between independent R&D and RJV regimes and s denotes a normal fraction of the research costs 
covered under independent R&D regime.12 
 
There are several factors which lure firms to form Research Joint Ventures in our model. First, the 
invention is shared and there is no chance of being driven out of the market in case the rival is first 
to finish the patent race. Second, firms remain symmetric and can sustain collusion more easily, 
which guarantees half monopoly profits with more efficient production. Third, joining forces 
facilitates the information flow between the R&D departments of two firms and it makes research 
more efficient. There are several ways to capture this effect: either through increased success 
probability or through research cost reductions, both of which are addressed in the model extension 
section.  
 
As before, we begin by analyzing the post discovery collusion. In this case both firms share the 
technology of the same efficiency level and can enjoy collusive profits more easily, while on the 
other hand the punishments are harsher due to symmetry. Recall that with symmetric firms the Nash 
expected competitive per period profits are equal to 0 rather than ߨ௅/2. Here we shall check whether 
firms will collude at the monopoly prices. Setting such prices is subgame perfect if firms’ time 
preferences are correct, i.e. if the common discount factor is high enough. This subgame follows a 
generic grim trigger strategy analysis and the critical discount factor without fine enforcement 
would be ߜ ൒ ଵଶ.  Considering a case with fine enforcement we can conclude that collusion post 
discovery is more profitable than deviation if 
 ߜ ൒ 12 ൅
ݍ݂
݉ ؠ ߜ
ோ.                           (4) 
It is straightforward to show that ߜோ is always below ߜ஺, its independent R&D analogue. Hence, 
similar to the conclusion of Miyagiwa (2009) we obtain that formation of an RJV in itself facilitates 
collusion after discovery through post-discovery symmetry. We define the post-discovery collusive 
strategy by R and assume that it is characterized by standard grim trigger strategies, where any 
deviation from the prescribed monopoly prices ݌௠ሺܿሻ triggers a marginal cost pricing. 
 
Now consider collusion prior the discovery. The timing is similar as in the case with independent 
R&D. We start at ݐ ൌ 1 when firms set monopoly prices ݌௠ሺܿሻ under the old technology. Then in 
any subsequent period ߬ there are four possible states: (I) no discovery in ߬ െ 1 and no price 
deviations to date; (II) no discovery in ߬ െ 1 and a price deviation has been observed before; (III) 
discovery in ߬ െ 1 and no price deviations to date; (IV) discovery in ߬ െ 1 and a price deviation has 
been observed before. In cases (II) and (IV) firms adopt a punishment strategy P. In case (III) firms 
adopt the post-discovery collusive strategy R. The collusive strategy prior the discovery in RJV case 
(call it RC) is subgame perfect except for the case (I) in which it is not clear if the collusive payoff 
prior discovery is higher than payoff from the one shot deviation. To check that, we write down the 
collusion expected payoffs within a joint venture (in the recursive form) 
                                                 
12 The current Seventh Framework guidelines suggest that subsidies are granted to international research consortia rather 
than to independently researching organizations. We assume that if independent companies seek funding elsewhere, they 
can get a smaller subsidy, or even none. 
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ோܸ஼ ൌ ݉2 െ ݍ݂ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ ൅
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ ቀ
݉
2 െ ݍ݂ቁ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ோܸ஼. 
Here firms receive half of the monopoly profits each before and after discovery and incur the 
subsidized R&D costs prior discovery. They also face a threat of being detected and penalized by 
the antitrust authorities in every period. If firms are successful, they enjoy the collusive profits with 
the new technology. This can be rewritten as 
ோܸ஼ ൌ
݉
2 െ ݍ݂ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ ൅
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ ቀ
݉
2 െ ݍ݂ቁ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ . 
Whereas a one-shot deviation before discovery can lead to the old technology monopoly profits less 
R&D costs for one period and then reverting to the punishment strategy P as long as discovery is not 
successful. If the discovery takes place, the firms follow the deviating strategy with Bertrand Nash 
profits equal 0. This strategy is denoted RD (RJV Deviation case) and its value is specified below 
ோܸ஽ ൌ ݉ െ ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௉ܸ. 
The firm will find it profitable to collude prior discovery if ோܸ஼ ൒ ோܸ஽ or if (5) is satisfied. 
 
 ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ
݉
2 ൅
ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൭
݉
2 ൅
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ ቀ
݉
2 െ
ߨ௅
2 ቁ൱ െ ࢗࢌ ቆ
2 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜ ቇ ൅ ࢑࢘ ൬
1
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ൰ ൒
݉
2  
        (5) 
   
This inequality implicitly defines ߜோ஼ሺݍ݂, ݎሻ critical discount factor, for collusion to be sustainable 
in RJV regime prior discovery. By analyzing the inequality (5) several results can be observed 
regarding fine enforcement and subsidization differences in the case of RJV. 
 
Proposition 5. Fines hinder collusion both before and after discovery in case of RJV. 
Proof: See Appendix A. ז 
 
Proposition 6. (i) Subsidy differences between independent R&D and RJV facilitate collusion prior 
discovery, but do not have an effect on collusion sustainability after discovery in the case of RJV.  
(ii) Generic subsidies given to both independent and cooperative R&D do not have an effect on 
collusion sustainability both before and after discovery. 
Proof: See Appendix A. ז 
 
5. Results and policy implications 
 
Miyagiwa (2009) finds that pre-discovery collusion under RJV is subgame perfect for ߜ ൒ 1/2. It is 
also implied in his paper that under the RJV regime the critical discount factor prior discovery is 
below 1/2 (without fine enforcement). This means that under the RJV regime firms find it easier to 
collude prior the discovery. It is possible to show (see Appendix B) that without fine enforcement 
and with positive subsidy differences this result still holds. It is thus clear that formation of RJV has 
collusion stabilizing effect prior the discovery, assuming there are no competition policy tools in 
place. 
 
5.1. Analysis of the fine - subsidy interaction 
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Let us now return to the issue of subsidization. As we can observe from the analysis of Proposition 5 
above, without the differences in subsidies grantable for RJVs, the effect of expected fines is 
unilateral and collusion-destabilizing. However, as was shown in the Proposition 6, high subsidy 
differences can have a collusion facilitating effect in case of RJV, basically bringing the ߜோ஼ 
thresholds back down. It needs to be analyzed to what extend can the subsidies for cooperative R&D 
be higher than for independent R&D in order for the overall policy not to facilitate collusion. Recall 
the inequality (5) which had the two terms related to these policy tools collected at the left hand 
side: െࢗࢌ ቀଶିఋሺଵିఈሻଵିఋ ቁ ൅ ࢑࢘ ቀ
ଵ
ଵିఋሺଵିఈሻቁ. Since we have shown that in the pre-discovery stage fines 
hinder collusion and subsidy differences facilitate it, and that the LHS of (5) is strictly increasing in 
ߜ, we can write down the condition for “non-facilitation”. The competition and innovation policy 
pair of expected fine and subsidy difference ሺݍ݂, ݎሻ will not facilitate pre-discovery collusion if: 
ݎ ൑ ݍ݂݇ ቆ
2 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜ ቇ ൫1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯ ؠ ݎ
௫ሺݍ݂ሻ. 
Let us define the value of ݎ, at which the above holds with strict equality by ݎ௫ሺݍ݂ሻ. We can plot 
ݎ௫ሺݍ݂ሻ in the ሺݎ, ݍ݂ሻ-space. This simple linear dependence with a positive slope is illustrated in the 
Figure 2. The possible positive subsidy difference is bounded from above by 1 െ ݏ, since we assume 
that governments do not grant subsidies above the costs of development.  
 
Some implications can be derived from the analysis of the slope of ݎ௫ሺݍ݂ሻ. The slope of this line 
decreases with ݇, or the R&D costs, meaning that the higher the costs are, the more difficult it is to 
hinder collusion with fine enforcement, given some level of ݎ. It is logical, since as the costs of 
development increase, the additional subsidies become more important than before. On the other 
hand, the slope of the line increases with ߙ, meaning that the higher is the probability of making the 
discovery, the more effective fines are to hinder collusion when there are higher than normal 
subsidies given to firms involved in RJV. The effect of ߙ can be explained as follows: as firms are 
aware that the probability of making a discovery is higher, they also anticipate that they are going to 
spend less for the development of their cost reducing technology. Thus, subsidies become less 
important and the collusion hindering effect of fines outweighs the collusion facilitating effect of 
RJV subsidies more easily.13  
 
A proposition consequently can be formulated with regard to the fine / subsidy interplay, which in 
fact serves as a remedy to the negative results of Proposition 6, where we have shown that subsidy 
differences can facilitate collusion prior discovery. 
 
Proposition 7. In a setting with subsidy differences r and expected fines ݍ݂, additional subsidies do 
not facilitate prior discovery collusion compared to the case without these policy instruments, as 
long as ݎ does not exceed ݎ௫ሺݍ݂ሻ ൌ ௤௙௞ ቀ
ଶିఋሺଵିఈሻ
ଵିఋ ቁ ሺ1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻሻ. 
                                                 
13 Recall equations for ߜோ and ߜோ஼ specified in (4) and (5). One of further implications for this setting is that even if we 
“cancel out” the prior discovery collusion hindering effects of fines with additional subsidies for RJV or vice versa, 
there will always remain the unaltered increase in the critical discount factor post discovery ߜோ. Therefore, the effect of 
fines does not nullify entirely if there are high subsidy differences, since in the product market after discovery collusion 
will still be destabilized. 
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The above figure and proposition imply that policymakers should consider designing the 
competition and innovation policy jointly if they wish to grant additional subsidies to research 
consortia. Governments which aim to maintain high levels of cooperative R&D but make sure not to 
facilitate collusion, should design subsidy programs such that percentages of additional subsidies for 
research consortia above general R&D subsidies would not exceed ݎ௫. Note that ݎ௫ can be 
estimated and calibrated based on market characteristics (such as ߜ, ݇, ߙ) and expected fines, implied 
by existing antitrust sentencing guidelines. 
 
5.2. Optimal policies and characterization of SPNE 
 
5.2.1. Optimal policies under independent R&D regime 
 
Some implications can also be derived in the ሺݍ݂, ݎሻ-space with regard to firms’ collusion choices 
under both Independent R&D and RJV regimes. Under Independent R&D, firms do not receive 
additional R&D subsidies; therefore, only the expected fine ݍ݂ is relevant as means of collusion 
sustainability control. Recall expressions for ߜ஺൫ݍ݂, ܿ൯ and ߜ஻൫ݍ݂, ܿ൯ or inequalities (2) and (3) 
respectively. It is straightforward to express ݍ݂ from both of them. Expression (2) implies 
ݍ݂ ൑ ߨேௌ൫2ߜ݉ െ ߜߨ௅ െ ݉൯ߨேௌ ൅ ݉ ؠ ࢗࢌ
࡭. 
While expression (3) implies 
ݍ݂ ൑
ߜߙ
2ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൫ߜ݉ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻߨேௌ െ ߨ௅൯ െ ݉൫1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯
1 ൅ ߜߙ2ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ቀ
݉
ߨேௌ ൅ 1ቁ
ؠ ࢗࢌ࡮. 
Figure 2. Collusion implications in the ሺݍ݂, ݎሻ-space. Cooperative R&D regime. 
1 
1 
ݍ݂ 
ݎ 
1 െ ݏ 
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1
݇ ቆ
2 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜ ቇ ሺ1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻሻ
Collusion is 
facilitated 
As ՝ ݇, ՛ ߙ 
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The above inequalities show the minimum levels of expected fines, above which sustaining 
collusion is not possible after discovery (ݍ݂஺) and before discovery (ݍ݂஻) under the Independent 
R&D regime. These expressions imply that knowing the market structure it is feasible to tune the 
expected fines so as to hinder collusion specifically prior or post discovery. Recalling Figure 1 
several points can be made regarding the relationship between ݍ݂஺ and ݍ݂஻. As cost reduction is 
low, i.e. difference between ݉ and ݉ is quite low, collusion before discovery is more difficult than 
after discovery, hence ݍ݂஺ ൐ ݍ݂஻. This means that collusion is more easily prevented with fines 
before the discovery than after the discovery. However, as cost reduction becomes higher, the 
relationship may reverse to ݍ݂஻ ൐ ݍ݂஺, since collusion prior discovery may be easier, and thus 
larger expected fine will be required to prevent collusion before discovery than after discovery. 
 
5.2.2. Optimal policies under cooperative RJV regime 
 
Similar analysis can be done for the RJV case. Here it is also possible to control the variable of 
subsidy differences ݎ which influences the prior discovery critical discount factor ߜோ஼ሺݍ݂, ݎ, ܿሻ. We 
also denote the critical value of ݍ݂ post discovery by ݍ݂ோ. This is the value of the expected fine 
above which post discovery collusion is not possible in the product market. We also derive the 
subsidization rule ݎோ஼ሺݍ݂ሻ above which collusion is sustainable prior discovery. From inequalities 
(4) and (5) we can isolate the critical value of the expected fine for collusion sustainability post 
discovery and the critical value of the subsidy difference pre-discovery. Expression (4) implies 
ݍ݂ ൑ ݉ ൬ߜ െ 12൰ ؠ ࢗࢌ
ࡾ. 
While expression (5) implies 
ݎ ൒ 1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ݇  ቆ
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ
݉
2 ൅
݉
2 െ
ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൭
݉
2 ൅
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ ቀ
݉
2 െ
ߨ௅
2 ቁ൱ ൅ ቆ
2 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜ ቇ ݍ݂ቇ ؠ ࢘
ࡾ࡯. 
 
The relationship between these values is illustrated in the Figure 3. Above the line ݎோ஼ሺݍ݂ሻ the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is to collude in the pre-discovery phase. Below this line 
collusion cannot be sustained, therefore, it can be shown that it is a SPNE to set competitive prices 
prior discovery. To the left of the vertical line ݍ݂ோ firms find it optimal to collude after discovery 
because enforcement is too weak. To the right of this value they do not collude post discovery, 
since enforcement is too strict for the collusion to be maintained. The above discussion and ideas 
illustrated in the Figure 3 can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 8. Optimal policies that implement fully competitive outcome require qf > ݍ݂ோ and 
ݎ < ݎோ஼ሺݍ݂ሻ. 
 
This proposition implies that in cases when fine enforcement is very strong and additional subsidies 
are low, firms will not collude at all. Partially competitive outcome still can be achieved with low 
expected fines and low subsidy differences. High subsidy differences in combination with low fines 
implement the worst for society outcome with collusion both before and after discovery. 
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5.3. Welfare Implications 
 
In the absence of fine enforcement, formation of an RJV has quite clear welfare implications.14 In 
the case of RJV, firms can freely collude for all ߜ ൒ ߜோ ൌ 1/2 and formation of an RJV is 
explained as a switch from one of the Areas of Figure 1 (without enforcement) to a case where 
collusion is always sustainable. Therefore, if we switch from full collusion in independent R&D 
regime to full collusion in RJV, social welfare is increased only due to an increase in total profits. 
Forming an RJV in that region, firms become more symmetric when colluding and, hence, sum of 
their profits increases. Hence, if the firms are encouraged to form RJVs, governments need to make 
sure that this increases also consumer welfare. 
 
In the model with competition policy through fine enforcement, we observe the following. Fines in 
independent R&D reduce areas 1, 2 and 3 at the same time increasing the set of pairs of ߜ, ܿ at 
which firms cannot collude at all. In addition, the RJV case has very different results than Miyagiwa 
(2009). Now there exist pairs of ߜ, ܿ for which collusion is not possible above ߜ ൌ 1/2  and hence 
there appear to be areas for which switching from Independent R&D to RJV can have positive social 
welfare implications without collusion in the RJV case compared to the same constitution of ߜ, ܿ in 
case with no enforcement. 
 
Plotting critical discount factors ߜ஺, ߜ஻, ߜோ, ߜோ஼ described in expressions (2), (3), (4), and (5) 
simultaneously in (ܿ, ߜሻ-diagram, we obtain Figure 4. Figure 4 specifies 3 zones which are of 
particular interest due to their appearance in effect of the combined competition and innovation 
                                                 
14 We define total social welfare as a sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits minus R&D costs (it does not matter 
who pays these costs).  
Figure 3. SPNE choices pre- and post- discovery in the ሺݍ݂, ݎሻ-space. Cooperative RJV regime.
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policy. Zone A in Figure 4 represents the state when setting monopoly prices can never be a SPNE 
for firms within the RJV. In Zone B it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for firms to set 
monopoly prices and share the market equally after the discovery, while playing a competitive game 
prior the discovery. In zone C, vice versa, an SPNE is to set monopoly prices before the discovery, 
but to set price equal marginal costs after the discovery.15 
 
Several policy implications may be drawn from this analysis. Firstly, since competition post 
discovery under RJV regime implies symmetry, firms will be aware of the occurring profit losses. 
The expected profits in the Independent R&D case are positive and the formation of an RJV implies 
nil profits. The best thing that a policymaker can do in this case (when firms’ time preferences are 
relatively short-sighted or ߜ is relatively low) is to make them indifferent between choosing to 
innovate within an RJV or not, with 100% subsidization. However, this may only happen, when the 
firms’ payoffs of playing the competitive strategy within the Independent R&D are negative, 
meaning ௉ܸ ൏ 0. Secondly, formation of an RJV in Zone B is not always profitable for firms, even 
though they get a chance to collude in the post discovery stage. Moreover, the total welfare is 
decreasing in Zone B with the formation of RJV. Therefore, the governments should not try to 
promote RJVs in that case. Thirdly, formation of an RJV in Zone C implies collusion only prior 
discovery and competition in the post discovery state. Here the welfare effect is ambiguous, since 
the policymaker has to weigh whether it is better to allow one firm to limit-price the other in the 
outcome of discovery or to afford some collusion under the old technology in the pre-discovery 
stage in order to enjoy infinite horizon competition within RJV in the post-discovery periods.  
 
The abovementioned results imply the following with respect to subsidization / enforcement. The 
implemented competition policy may not be largely effective in increasing welfare in Zones A or C 
if firms will not be willing to form an RJV. If the governments suspect that the time preferences of 
the firms are characterized by a low discount factor, i.e. we are in either of the Zones A, B or C and 
firms are willing to form RJVs, then several scenarios are possible: either the firms are aiming at (1) 
large cost reductions in Zone B or (2) at low cost reductions in Zone C. In the case (1) additional 
subsidies for RJVs should not be granted since formation of RJV in that region implies welfare 
losses. Thus the antitrust authorities should pay stricter attention to the post discovery duopoly. In 
case (2) governments should not be cautious of increasing subsidization if they believe that the RJV 
will have an overall welfare increasing effect. Giving additional subsidies pulls ߜோ஼ down and 
“expands” Zone C, making it more likely that firms will be willing to form an RJV, and also 
increases the range of ܿ for which the welfare effect of forming an RJV is at least ambiguous and 
not negative.  
 
Lastly, if we observe that firms are not willing to form an RJV at all, then we may suspect that they 
are in Zone A or the fines are too large in Zones B or C. Zone A is the first best, since it induces 
social welfare maximization as firms are producing at the new technology and set price equal 
marginal costs. In that case, however, governments need to impose innovation by fully subsidizing 
the costs of development, or else the firms will not be willing to innovate. If costs of development 
are fully subsidized, then the expected fines need to be very high in order to “create” the Zone A. It 
then boils down to evaluation, which situation is the best for the government: no collusion, but full 
subsidization and a very expensive enforcement policy (through Zone A) or a less strict fine 
enforcement policy and an ambiguous welfare effect through RJV formation (Zone C). In general, if 
                                                 
15 More detailed derivations are provided in Appendix C.  
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the government is aiming at maximizing the Zone C, then it is better to keep the subsidies high but 
enforcement moderate. This will increase the chances that firms will be willing to form an RJV. 
 
6. Model extensions 
 
Until now we have assumed that the input spillovers were complete and that firms enjoyed equal 
success probabilities in the development stage both in Independent R&D and RJV.  Let us now 
introduce incomplete input spillovers first in the form of different costs of research and then in the 
form of different success probabilities. In the following analysis we distinguish different success 
probabilities in a stochastic discrete time environment, which we call the effect of “spillovers”. If we 
carry on with the reasoning by Miyagiwa (2009), where he points out that firms retain their R&D 
units, then a probability of success in execution of the research implies that when firms join forces, 
the information flow between them becomes more efficient or even perfect (in other words, spillover 
rate equals one, as in Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992)). We assume in our model that the lower is 
the difference between these two probabilities, the higher are the “spillovers” in the independent 
environment. 
 
6.1. R&D cost spillovers, OE joint ventures, and different success probabilities 
 
Firstly, assume that the costs of research are different for independent and cooperative R&D. We 
implement it in our model by introducing an additional exogenous cost reducing variable (call it ݆). 
Hence, forming an RJV means that costs of development reduce additionally by ݆݇, making the total 
costs ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎ െ ݆ሻ. It is very straightforward that this variable bears an effect only on the critical 
discount factor prior discovery ߜோ஼. This effect is exactly the same as of ݎ, except that it cannot be 
controlled by the regulator. We can thus say that the higher the spillovers are (the closer ݆ is to 0), 
ܿௗ  ܿ 
1
2  
1 
ܿ 
ߜ 
ߜோ 
Figure 4: Zones of welfare effects of RJV formation. Example when enforcement is moderate. 
ߜோ஼ 
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ߜ஺ 
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the higher is the critical discount factor of RJV prior the discovery. Introduction of incomplete 
knowledge spillovers does not change many of the implications in our model, except that if we want 
to maintain the status quo, governments have to either give lower subsidies to RJVs than to 
independent researchers or increase the expected fines. In other words it diminishes the ݎ௫ by a 
constant value, bringing some part of it below 0, meaning it is harder now not to facilitate collusion. 
 
A formation of an OE (operating entity) joint venture is usually accompanied by equal sharing of the 
costs development. It can also be modeled as an “R&D cost spillovers” case described above with 
݆ ൌ ଵି௦ି௥ଶ . The latter means that ߜோ஼ will be lower compared to the situation within an RJV, thus 
implying that formation of an OE joint venture is more collusion stabilizing. Moreover, under OE 
joint ventures the generic R&D subsidy term ݏ does not cancel out from the inequality (5) and, 
therefore, they bear collusion facilitating effects too. 
 
Different success probabilities also have a similar effect. If we assume that the probabilities of 
success are different for RJV versus independent R&D, the inequality (5) can be rewritten with 
higher success probability. Denoting the probability of success under RJV by α ൅ ߚ, while 
probability of success in independent R&D case is still α, we can analyze a modified version of 
inequality (5). Similarly as with the R&D cost spillovers, critical discount factor ߜோ஼ is increasing in 
both α and ߚ, and the bigger the difference in probability of success between the independent R&D 
regime and RJV regime, the higher the critical discount factor for RJV prior discovery, ߜோ஼,  which 
is similar to the effect of higher R&D cost spillovers discussed above. 
 
6.2. Block exemption regulations 
 
Following the legislation of the European Commission with regard to competition rules on 
horizontal co-operation agreements, it is also possible to briefly comment on the so-called block 
exemption regulations and their general implications for collusion sustainability. According to the 
current block exemption rules, firms cooperating in R&D can enjoy 7 years of exemption from the 
actions of competition authorities. Let us try to incorporate it within our model, let the period of 
exemption be ܶ. The condition for no-deviation from collusion in post-discovery (RJV case) then 
becomes ݉
2 െ ߜ்ݍ݂
1 െ ߜ ൒ ݉ 
Since ߜ is below 1, from the inequality above we can observe that with larger T firms expect less 
strict punishments, and thus the critical discount factor will fall with ܶ. This would be reflected 
through shallower increase of ߜோ with higher ݍ݂. Before discovery the picture would be similar. 
With positive T, we would observe a lower multiplier of the term ݍ݂ in inequality (5) and a decrease 
the slope of ݎ௫, meaning that it would be more difficult to cancel the collusion sustainability effects 
of additional subsidies for RJVs, if they are given. It would also mean that firms would be more 
eager to form an RJV. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the paradox of encouraging cooperation in R&D while at the same time 
prohibiting other types of horizontal agreements, most notably collusion.  A fixed expected fine and 
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R&D subsidization were employed to analyze the interaction between the innovation and 
competition policy adopting a framework of Miyagiwa (2009).  
 
Stochastic trigger strategy setting was chosen to carry out the analysis, trying to fill the existing gap 
in the current research on cooperative innovation policy, which up to date has mainly been 
concentrating on deterministic innovation. The focus has been kept on non-drastic innovation, which 
implied the possibility of collusion in the ensuing post discovery markets under the Independent 
R&D regime. Additional R&D subsidies have been shown to facilitate collusion prior discovery in 
the RJV setting, whereas subsidies per se had no effect on collusion sustainability under 
Independent R&D. The rationale behind this result is that under independent R&D firms receive the 
same R&D subsidies no matter whether they collude or not. Under RJV collaboration, which is 
promoted by the EU, the innovating firms may be enjoying larger subsidies when innovating 
together and thus not willing to deviate from collusive agreements if such were formed. The 
problem that additional subsidies to RJVs could facilitate collusion prior discovery can be remedied 
by simultaneous joint design of innovation and competition policy. Governments which aim to 
maintain high levels of cooperative R&D but make sure not to facilitate collusion, should design 
subsidy programs such that percentages of additional subsidies for research consortia above general 
R&D subsidies would not exceed certain threshold levels, which should depend on market 
characteristics and expected fines, implied by existing antitrust sentencing guidelines. 
 
The role of expected fines was shown to be collusion destabilizing both prior and after the 
discovery. More importantly, the result that fines are more effective in hindering collusion post 
discovery than after the discovery has shown that the paradox found by Miyagiwa (2009) can be 
remedied with the use of antitrust policy tools. In general, the paradox constituted a situation in 
which collusion prior discovery would become easier with the formation of RJV, while independent 
innovation had reverse results. Therefore, the implementation of antitrust fines could make the RJV 
collusion prior discovery more difficult than after the discovery. However, the general result that 
collusion is easier under cooperative RJV remained true even after the implementation of the 
competition policy. The validity of this effect is only amplified if firms are allowed to form OE joint 
ventures. 
 
The implications for the joint design of competition and innovation policy depend on the aims of the 
policymakers. Article 101 of the EC Treaty is explicit with respect to collusion prevention; however, 
the innovation is also promoted through subsidies given out to RJVs. We show that competition and 
innovation policy may be implemented together, however, the authorities should be aware not to 
over-subsidize the industry and induce collusion where it is undesirable. We also point out that the 
best welfare-wise outcome, achievable through the formation of an RJV, is only possible when firms 
are not willing to innovate under the independent R&D regime and only through full subsidization 
and strict fine enforcement. In other words, such policy might be too expensive for the government 
and thus it may be better to strive for the second best solution, where some joint exploitation is 
allowed to the mutually innovating firms. If the government sees the RJV as socially desirable in 
that case, it is then plausible to subsidize the joint innovation, which might induce collusion at the 
development stage. However, as the antitrust fines successfully hinder collusion in the period after 
discovery, the total welfare effect of allowing RJVs might be still positive.  
 
Unfortunately, in such a model formation of an RJV does not improve welfare for all cost reduction 
and discount factor levels. Furthermore, the general policy result of Miyagiwa (2009) that 
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governments should watch more closely innovating firms that are aiming at high cost reductions 
remains true after the implementation of subsidization and antitrust enforcement. Therefore, the 
practice of evaluating firms prior to allowing them to form cooperative research agreements still 
should be utilized by the European Commission. 
 
Further research could be carried out in the direction of this paper, implementing a higher number of 
firms with only a subset of innovating ones in order to evaluate the effects of Block Exemption 
regulations more thoroughly (particularly with regard to the market share threshold rule). As a 
general fact, the empirical support for theoretical findings on collusion is extremely difficult to 
obtain; however, some behavioral patterns might be discovered when evaluating the propensity of 
firms to form RJVs under the presence of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies. A dynamic panel data 
analysis of concentration index changes overtime in subsidized high-tech industries could also be 
evaluated in order to confirm the finding that subsidies for cooperative R&D may induce collusion, 
and higher market concentration. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
First, note that the left hand side of inequality (3) is differentiable and increasing in ߜ (since ݉ ൒
ߨேௌሻ. Furthermore, it goes to infinity as ߜ approaches 1. Thus, if we prove that the inequality fails to 
hold at ߜ ൌ ଵଶ, it would confirm that there exists a ߜ א ቀ
ଵ
ଶ , 1ቁ at which (2) holds with strict equality. 
Evaluating the equation at ߜ ൌ ଵଶ and rearranging we get: 
1
2 ߙ ൭൬
1
2 െ
ݍ݂
ߨேௌ൰ ߨூௌ െ ൬
1
2 ൅
ݍ݂
ߨேௌ൰ ߨேௌ െ 2ݍ݂ െ ߨ௅ െ ݉൱ ൒ ݍ݂. 
Rearranging further implies 
1
2 ߨூௌ ൅
1
2 ߨேௌ െ ߨ௅ െ ݉ ൒
2ݍ݂
ߙ ൅ ݍ݂ ൅
ݍ݂
ߨேௌ ߨூௌ. 
First, let us point out that the right hand side of the equation is positive. It is then possible to show 
that the left hand side of the equation above is in fact negative, which in turn makes the above 
inequality false and proves that there exists a ߜ, at which (3) holds with equality. The following 
result shows that the left hand side of (3) is always negative. 
1
2 ߨூௌ ൅
1
2 ߨேௌ െ ߨ௅ െ ݉ ൌ 
ൌ 12 ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ ൅
1
2 ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ  ܦሺܿሻ൫ܿ െ ܿ൯ 
െܦ൫݌௠ሺܿሻ൯ሺ݌௠ሺܿሻ െ ܿሻ ൏ 
൏ 12 ܦሺܿሻ൫2݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ െ ܿ െ ܿ ൅ ܿ൯ െ ܦ൫݌௠ሺܿሻ൯ሺ݌௠ሺܿሻ െ ܿሻ െ
1
2 ܦሺܿሻ൫ܿ െ ܿ൯ ൌ 
ൌ  ܦሺܿሻ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ ܦ൫݌௠ሺܿሻ൯ሺ݌௠ሺܿሻ െ ܿሻ െ ଵଶ ܦሺܿሻ൫ܿ െ ܿ൯ ൏ 0.  ז 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
Proof is straightforward, since subsidy variable s is absent from both expression (2) and expression 
(3).  ז 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
(i) ߜ஺ in (2) unambiguously increases in ݍ݂, thus positive expected fines destabilize post-discovery 
collusion.  
(ii) The left hand side of the inequality (3) unambiguously increases in ߜ and decreases in the 
expected fine ݍ݂. Hence, if we fix the level of the LHS of expression (3) at ݉, with larger ݍ݂ larger 
ߜ will be required to sustain the same level of the LHS of (3) in the range of ߜ א ሺ0,1ሻ. Hence, ߜ஻ is 
also increasing in ݍ݂ and thus destabilizes pre-discovery collusion.  ז 
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Proof of Proposition 5: 
 
Proof: (i) The critical discount factor to sustain collusion after the discovery, ߜோ, is described by the 
inequality (4). It is clear that ߜோ is increasing in ݍ݂, and thus an increase in expected fine hinders 
collusion after discovery.  
(ii) To prove the same for the case before discovery, note that the left hand side of (5) is increasing 
in ߜ and decreasing in ݍ݂, since the multiplier of the expected fine ቀଶିఋሺଵିఈሻଵିఋ ቁ is strictly positive for 
the entire range of ߙ and ߜ. Now, if we keep the value of the left hand side fixed at ௠ଶ  and let ݍ݂ 
increase, we have to require higher ߜ to sustain the same level of the LHS. It is thus the case that 
critical discount factor preceding discovery is increasing in ݍ݂. This provides the proof that increase 
in ݍ݂ hinders collusion before discovery as well. ז 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
 
Proof: (i) After the discovery, firms do not invest in R&D any longer, and do not receive subsidies. 
Due to the backward induction solution of this game, there is no lingering effect of subsidization 
when either of the firms has made a discovery. We can see thus that neither ݏ, nor ݎ enter the 
inequality (4), which proves that subsidies and subsidy differences have no effect on the post 
discovery collusion stability.  
On the other hand, differences in subsidization seem to help to sustain collusion prior the discovery. 
By examining the inequality (5) we can notice the LHS is strictly increasing in ݎ. The LHS is also 
strictly increasing in δ, thus for (5) to hold with strict equality δ needs to drop in order to maintain 
the same levels of the LHS. This concludes the proof that the critical discount factor of RJV prior 
the discovery is decreasing in ݎ, having facilitating effects for collusion. 
(ii) The generic subsidy parameter is absent from both (4) and (5). Hence, subsidies do not affect 
critical discount factors ߜோ and ߜோ஼. We can conclude that subsidies per se do not have an effect on 
collusion sustainability both prior and after the discovery in the RJV case. ז 
 
Appendix B: 
 
In this appendix we show that with additional subsidies granted to firms if they form RJVs, or 
without subsidies, firms do not have profitable deviations for ߜ ൒ ଵଶ prior the discovery. Recall 
inequality (5) but set antitrust fines to 0, ݍ݂ ൌ 0. Then it can be rewritten as 
 ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ
݉
2 ൅
ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൭
݉
2 ൅
ߜߙ
1 െ ߜ ቀ
݉
2 െ
ߨ௅
2 ቁ൱ ൅ ݇ݎ ൬
1
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ൰ ൒
݉
2   
The left hand side is going to infinity as ߜ approaches 1, so the inequality always holds when ߜ ൌ 1. 
Showing that this inequality also holds at ߜ ൌ ଵଶ would imply that deviation is not profitable with or 
without additional subsidies for RJVs in the range ߜ א ቂଵଶ , 1ቃ. Evaluating the inequality at ߜ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ 
ߙ ݉2 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
2 ቆ
݉ ൅ ߙ൫݉ െ ߨ௅൯
ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ ቇ ൒
݉
2 െ
2݇ݎ
ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ 
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Now, we can show that ௠ାఈ൫௠ିగಽ൯ሺଵାఈሻ ൐ ݉ 
݉ ൅ ߙ൫݉ െ ߨ௅൯ െ ݉ െ ߙ݉
ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ ൐ 0 
Therefore, if ݉ െ ߨ௅ െ ݉ ൐ 0, then ௠ାఈ൫௠ିగಽ൯ሺଵାఈሻ ൐ ݉.  
݉ െ ߨ௅ െ ݉ ൐ ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ ܦሺܿሻ൫ܿ െ ܿ൯ െ ܦሺܿሻሺ݌௠ሺܿሻ െ ܿሻ ൐ 
ൌ ܦ ቀ݌௠൫ܿ൯ቁ ൫݌௠൫ܿ൯ െ ܿ൯ െ ܦሺܿሻ൫݌௠ሺܿሻ െ ܿ൯ ൐ 0 
By obtaining this result, the following holds 
ߙ ݉2 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
2 ቆ
݉ ൅ ߙ൫݉ െ ߨ௅൯
ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ ቇ ൐ ߙ
݉
2 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
݉
2 ൐
݉
2 െ
2݇ݎ
ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ 
Consequently, firms have no profitable deviations in the RJV case prior discovery for the range of 
ߜ א ቂଵଶ , 1ቃ both with or without positive additional RJV subsidies.  
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Through straightforward comparison of payoffs we can come to several conclusions about firm’s 
R&D choices. The first question is will firms be willing to form an RJV if they find themselves in 
Zone A of Figure 4. In Zone A firms have profitable deviations from the collusive agreement and 
thus it will be a SPNE for them to compete both prior and post discovery, both under the 
Independent R&D and RJV regimes. The expected profits of competition under Independent R&D 
are equal to the payoffs of the “punishment” strategy ௉ܸ defined before, whereas the RJV 
competition expected payoffs ோܸ௓஺ (for RJV Zone A) if firms innovate are below or equal 0, since 
firms are symmetrical both prior and after the collusion. As a result we have 
௉ܸ ൌ
െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ߜߙ2 ቀ
ߨ௅1 െ ߜቁ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ  
ோܸ௓஺ ൌ െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 0 
Therefore, firms will form an RJV in Zone A if  ௉ܸ ൐ ோܸ௓஺ or will be indifferent if ௉ܸ ൌ ோܸ௓஺. Our 
former assumption stated that costs firms pay for development are low enough so that ௉ܸ ൐ 0. Let us 
relax this assumption, since otherwise firms will never form an RJV. Actually, the best a 
policymaker can do in this case is to make firms indifferent between investing in R&D and forming 
RJVs by giving full subsidies if firms form an RJV, thus setting ݎ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݏሻ. 
 
Firstly, we can conclude that firms will always be willing to form an RJV if fine enforcement is high 
enough and cost reduction is high enough (Zone B of Figure 4). If firms are in Zone B, then they can 
collude only after the discovery. In that case their payoffs ோܸ௓஻ are 
ோܸ௓஻ ൌ
െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ ൅ ߜߙ2 ൬
݉ െ ݍ݂
1 െ ߜ ൰
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ  
Firms will be forming an RJV in Zone B if 
݇ݎ ൅ ߜߙ2 ൬
݉ െ ݍ݂
1 െ ߜ ൰ ൐
ߜߙ
2 ቀ
ߨ௅
1 െ ߜቁ 
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If firms find themselves in Zone C of the Figure 4, it is a SPNE for them to collude prior discovery, 
but set competitive prices after the discovery. In other words, their payoffs of forming an RJV in 
Zone C are 
ோܸ௓஼ ൌ
െ݇ሺ1 െ ݏ െ ݎሻ ൅ ݉2 െ ݍ݂
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ߙሻ  
Forming an RJV will be more profitable than innovating independently if ோܸ௓஼ ൐ ௉ܸ or if 
݇ݎ ൅ ݉2 െ ݍ݂ ൐
ߜߙ
2 ቀ
ߨ௅
1 െ ߜቁ 
In other words, it will depend on series of parameters such as the discount factor, demand function 
parameters, probability of success, level of R&D investments and subsidy differences. All else 
equal, the higher are the R&D expenditures and the subsidy differences and the lower is the discount 
rate and probability of success are, the more likely the firms will be to form an RJV if they find 
themselves in Zone C (Figure 4).  
 
 
Appendix D:  
Brief overview of the EU competition and innovation policies with the focus on cooperative R&D 
 
D.1. Antitrust enforcement and cooperative R&D 
 
The attitude of antitrust authorities to any kind of cooperation between firms was not particularly 
lenient when they have first started appearing. However, around 1970s and 1980s both the US and 
European legislators had to change their perspectives on the research partnerships. According to 
Caloghirou et al. (2003) this was due to several reasons. Firstly, the policy-makers acted driven by 
the alarm that their home R&D markets would start failing as a result of increasing global 
competition in the field of hi-tech research, where cooperative agreements were quite abundant. 
There has been evidence of benefits extracted from such agreements, through the possibility of 
accessing within-alliance superior technologies and having better opportunities of developing more 
efficient technologies on their own. In hand with these developments, the general perception of the 
research partnerships as seen by the policy-makers and analysts has started to shift dramatically. 
Previously, the research agreements were viewed as mechanisms to support falling industries, while 
now the view was moving towards supporting them as effective drivers of competition in the 
emerging industries. Such a change was accompanied by the fact that prior 1970s a huge shares of 
cooperative agreements have been implemented within low-to-medium tech industries, whereas late 
1970s have seen the rise of high tech RJV and equity venture formation.  
 
This in turn has served as a stimulus for the governments to create RJV-friendly legal and policy 
frameworks that would propel the industries to compete on an international level in the hi-tech field. 
The cooperative R&D has gained political support in both EU countries and the US. The latter have 
mainly been focusing on introducing stronger patent protection and weakening the antitrust laws in 
order to promote RJVs. European Union was in general moving in the same direction, with the 
exception that it had an additional problem to cope with: the huge technological gaps within its 
borders, or among the member states. As a response to this issue, EU created a pioneering program 
called ESPRIT to encourage the international (inter-member) cooperation in R&D and public 
support for pre-competitive cooperative R&D. The ESPRIT program evolved into what we know 
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today as the Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development. These 4-year 
(recently the period has been extended) programs encompassed the entire policy bundle through 
which the EU supports its R&D activities in concrete areas of focus. The following subsection will 
present the EU research promoting programs in more detail. 
 
D.2. Characteristics of the EU research promoting programs 
 
As already has been mentioned, the EU Framework Programs for Research and Technological 
Development were established as a response to the emerging competitiveness of the global R&D 
markets. Indeed, as is stated by the EU Research and Innovation Directorate General, the main aims 
of the Framework Program are “to strengthen the scientific and technological base of European 
Industry and to encourage its international competitiveness, while promoting research that supports 
EU policies”. In its current 7th incarnation, the Framework Program is endowed with a huge budget 
of Euro 50 billion to promote EU-beneficial research and development. However, it claims not to be 
constrained entirely to the EU countries, even though the latter enjoy broader rights of obtaining the 
support. For instance, if Russian or Central Asian states intended to form a research consortium 
under the support of the FP program, they would need to make sure that enough European Union 
member states were involved.   
 
The funding is provided on the principle of co-financing, or in other words subsidizing a part of the 
research costs. The subsidies are given mostly for collaborative research, under the condition that all 
the results are freely available among the participants. The size of the subsidy may vary according to 
the type of the project undertaken, but the standard reimbursement is set at 50%. Legal entities such 
as non-profit public organizations, SMEs, research organizations may receive grants of up to 75%. 
A subsidy of 100% may also be reimbursed for a narrow range of activities, such as consortium 
management, training coordination, or participation in the “frontier research” programs on the 
grounds of scientific excellence. The current FP is set to last for 7 years from 2007 until 2013, 
which is a change in both breadth and scope, since preceding programs have been covering 4 years 
each with significantly lower funds. The research policy carried out by the FP programs is of a top-
down nature, meaning that the companies apply for the grants that are available for specific fields of 
research chosen by the EU. 
 
Due to the vast budgets of the FPs, they have also been subject to criticism because of their 
administrative complexity. Marin and Siotis (2008) argue that the tendering procedures that 
companies applying for the subsidies must undergo are time consuming and burdensome in nature. 
Furthermore, being an institution to encompass the execution of the entire EU research policy, it 
also tries to pursue multiple, sometimes inconsistent goals. For instance, the FP programs emphasize 
the adherence of all the participants’ conduct to EU competition law, and hence subjects many of its 
granting decisions based on the competition considerations. At the same time the programs try to 
promote competitiveness in the international high technology markets, where big corporations in 
concentrated industries are more likely to make a stand.  
 
D.3. General EU competition law 
 
The part of the competition policy of the European Union that covers the issues relevant to this 
paper can be addressed through several major Articles of EC Treaty: Article 101 (ex 81 Treaty of 
European Communities or TEC) and Article 102 (ex 82 TEC) and their consequent modifications, 
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which address the horizontal and vertical agreements and the abuse of dominant position by the 
firms. This subsection aims to summarize the general implications of the legislation with regard to 
price collusion; therefore, we are mostly interested in the Article 101 and not Article 102, which 
deals with exclusionary practices and market power abuse.  
 
D.3.1. Block exemption regulations for cooperative R&D 
 
Even though the innovation policy allowing the formation of RJVs was in place since the 
commencement of the ESPRIT program, the European Commission still had to routinely check 
through all of the R&D cooperatives for possible anti-competitive effects. It has been a burdensome 
and inefficient process, since the limited resources had to be disseminated to analyze hundreds of 
minor cooperative agreements instead of focusing on the most important ones. Amendments to the 
Block Exemption regulations implemented in the early 2000s have made it easier for the 
Commission to filter the cooperative R&D agreements. The application of the block exemption 
implies automatic approval of the agreement and an exemption of the involved agents from anti-
competitive concerns for a certain period of time. The changes in the legal framework of the 
exemptions throughout the years have been towards the liberalization upon the previous regimes 
(Topping, 2001). According to the most recent regulation No 1217/2010 covering the block 
exemptions, several notable conditions need to be fulfilled for the agreement to be eligible for the 
application of the block exemption: 
[1] The research and development agreement must stipulate that all the parties have full access to the final 
results of the joint research and development or paid-for research and development, including any 
resulting intellectual property rights and know-how. [2] The research and development agreement must 
stipulate that each party must be granted access to any pre-existing know-how of the other parties, if this 
know-how is indispensable for the purposes of its exploitation of the results. [3] Any joint exploitation 
may only pertain to results which are protected by intellectual property rights or constitute know- how and 
which are indispensable for the manufacture of the contract products or the application of the contract 
technologies16. 
Where the conditions labeled [1]-[3] correspond directly to factual formation of an RJV, due to the 
requirement of full information (or R&D outcome) sharing. An additional requirement for the block 
exemption is the market share threshold, which is currently set at 25%. It implies that the exemption 
shall apply only to research and development agreements, where the combined market share of the 
involved parties in the relevant markets shall not exceed 25%. The period of exemption is currently 
set at the duration of research plus additional 7 years of joint exploitation, meaning that during this 
period the participants are exempted from the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102. If after the end 
of this period the combined market share of the parties does not exceed 25%, the block exemption 
may be extended. 
                                                 
16 Numbers in squared brackets do not correspond to actual paragraphs of the regulation. Conditions for exemption are 
covered by Article 2 paragraphs 2-5. 
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